"Nepal needs direct access to finance from global pool for disasters"

Since the onset of the monsoon in June, people have been suffering due to multiple disasters — landslides, floods, heavy rainfall, and lightning — all at once. As many as 211 people have lost their lives to these calamities since June 1, shows DRR portal. The total number of missing and injured corresponds to 43 and 273 respectively.

Prior to the monsoon, the country was engulfed in wildfires from January to May which claimed 17 lives, including three Nepal Army personnel deployed to douse the fire in Dolpa.

Disasters have been wreaking havoc on Nepal and its economy. The nation finds itself trapped in a loop of mayhem around the year, ranging from roaring disasters such as floods, landslides, and wildfires and cold and heat waves to other silent disasters like snake bites, animal attacks, dengue endemics, drowning, devoid of drinking water and so on.

In light of the same, the_farsight on July 7 interviewed Anil Pokhrel, the chief executive of the central resource agency — National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA) discussing the agency’s evolution since its establishment in 2019. 

We talk about subjects ranging from how the state understood disasters earlier and the shift in that understanding over the years to the responsibilities and duties of NDRRMA, and the challenges and financial constraints in mitigating disasters. We also speak on the working plans and operations the federal agency has executed since its inception in December 2019.

Pokhrel explains to us about trends of a few disasters, and the induction of new technologies and practises into Nepal’s disaster risk reduction and management framework. Since the mitigation measures are way expensive, he emphasises that disaster-prone countries like Nepal should get easy and direct access to the global financing pool for combating disaster [since climate change is catalysing disasters in Nepal]. 

We begin with understanding when and why we realised the need for a separate central agency. (The interview has been condensed for clarity.)

Let’s start from the background. What led to forming the NDRRMA? What did we do for four and a half years?

The earthquake of 2015 made everyone — including lawmakers who were busy with the process of drafting a new constitution — realise the need to invest in risk reduction, reconstruction, and recovery. 

The then most prevailing act was the Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, 1982, which guided us with a post-disaster perspective — relief, search, and rescue. If someone died, we would hand over something like Rs 100,000. For displaced ones, we would distribute food and tents, etc. while reconstruction and recovery were completely forgotten. We did a little bit here and there for risk reduction.

We then needed laws that looked into understanding risk, impacts of climate change, risk reduction and management, and governance, especially in light of the federal structures. If we invest 1 rupee in risk reduction instead of having to spend on post-disaster relief, rescue, and reconstruction, the return is massive — somewhere between a ratio of 1:7 and 1:20. The previous modality which focused only on relief, search, and rescue was overturned following this overall realisation.

Now, the Constitution enlists disaster management as a prerogative of local governments, while the federal and provincial governments have concurrent roles — providing necessary technical and financing resources. 

Based on this spirit of the constitution, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, 2017 was also enacted focusing on risk reduction. 

The 2015 earthquake and the pain we suffered were the catalysts for this act. Efforts to come up with this act and its corresponding agency started in 2005 following the Hyogo framework, which advocated for a national agency for disaster management. Just a month before the earthquake in April, Nepal had adopted a non-binding Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

The 2017 Act provides for the National Council for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (chaired by the Prime Minister) and the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Executive Committee (chaired by the Home Minister). 

The same provision is replicated in the province. The district has a disaster management committee with the sole role of response, led by the Chief District Officer.

The NDRRM Regulations came into effect in December 2019, subsequently founding the central resource agency, i.e. NDRRMA, responsible for disaster preparedness and response plans and I was appointed as its first CEO. 

NDRRMA under the Ministry of Home Affairs is primarily tasked with assessing disaster risks in consultation with stakeholders and coordinating with government bodies across the three tiers including all three security agencies, non-government organisations such as Red Cross, and the private sector to carry out operations.

The current scenario is that development partners look for intermediaries. You need to fulfill due diligence, accrediting certain institutions. This process has become heavy. There needs to be a fast-track mechanism for fund mobilisation for disaster-vulnerable countries like ours. The money needs to be conditioned for spending according to the national priorities through agencies like NDRRMA — to quickly build houses damaged by floods and landslides, move from high-risk zones to safer zones, etc.

How does NDRRMA develop and carry out plans?

In the last four and a half years, we’ve come up with a monsoon preparedness and response plan, which takes around two and a half months to formulate. It’s a whole-of-a-society plan, whereby every ministry has to prepare plans corresponding to their jurisdiction, including inputs from the police, the army, the APF, the Red Cross, and the private sector.

We compile and present a summarised plan to the executive committee, which has other three ministers — Health [and Population], Urban [Development], and Federal Affairs [and General Administration], and secretaries of all other ministries. I serve as its member secretary. The executive committee endorses this monsoon preparedness and response plan, then we roll it out for implementation.

We then go to every province providing them with social and technical assistance to prepare their plans. No other country, especially in South Asia, where monsoon has a forceful impact yearly, has such a practice.

Additionally, we made some specific decisions like establishing a 24x7 operational command post constituting officials from the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Irrigation, the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, the Department of Roads, and others. We also run road command posts to coordinate response efforts.

Earlier, certain clusters and subsets of a few ministries would work in this. We lacked the understanding that all ministries should work together and prepare as a whole of society.

Now, if you look at Sindhupalchowk’s Melamchi case, it was one of the swift responses in Nepali history. We did monsoon pre-positioning not only in Chautara but also in Melamchi. For some reason, we decided to disperse. Melamchi was not the only one that sustained damages but also Helambu, where six major bridges were destroyed. We immediately installed Bailey bridges to restore connectivity.

Prior to that, we set up nine receiving centres, including one in Melamchi’s army barrack, and kept relief materials in the warehouse. We distributed those materials fairly among all nine centres employing road or airdrop. One door policy with proper due record is one of the most effective.

Look at Karnali. About 81.4% of the buildings are made out of rounded-up stones and mud mortars, without any vertical or horizontal bonds, bindings, and lintels — making such buildings death traps. By demolishing all those death trap-like houses and buildings and reconstructing new ones, perhaps steel-designed, only then could we save lives.

How threatening are disasters to Nepal in light of anomalous weather patterns and their intensity?

There have been two peaks in the Monsoon in terms of deaths and damage — late July (Shrawan beginning) and early September (Bhadra ending). Otherwise, it’s less if you count from June 29 (Asar 15) — almost zero since monsoon events hadn’t fully developed. Years 2021, 2023, and 2024 are unique in that sense, but unfortunate.

In the first week of the onset of [2021] monsoon that entered eastern Nepal, Melamchi saw incessant rainfall on June 15 while it was yet to develop in Terai. Suddenly, a spell came in and struck the country. Many of us know about the Melamchi disaster due to large media coverage as it impacted Kathmandu’s drinking water supply while the damage incurred was also large.

Melamchi headworks, the first inter-basin transfer of water, was based on a pressure flow tunnel, which got buried under 20 to 24 metres of rubble. This component of the project alone cost us millions of dollars. Fortunately, the debris did not enter the tunnel, otherwise, the whole 24 kilometres long tunnel would have to be abandoned.

Floods hit Mustang, Manang, and Gorkha and there was huge damage even in Bajura, Jajarkot. What is striking is such damage taking place in the eastern Himalayas, particularly in Melamchi, Gorkha, Manang, and Mustang means there is something wrong with the whole monsoon pattern and systems. That’s why it’s attributed to climate change. 

The monsoon started and ended with a big bang as a big system [monsoon] from the west came in and battered all over Nepal [in October after Dashain] when the monsoon was already declared over. Paddy grains were kind of wiped out that year, causing a loss of over Rs 12 billion. We lost [31] people in Panchthar [alone]. So, look at the two extremes. These two systems were completely outliers for us. This is exactly how disasters would impact a Himalayan country like ours.

There were three other unprecedented disasters [some less reported in the media] that happened in between.

One was wildfires, which we were fighting in the middle of the monsoon. 

Two, people suffered from drought in Birgunj and nearby regions. They faced an acute shortage of drinking water as the underground water level hit low. Ponds dried up, household fires got worse and farming became difficult. It grew worse in 2023 and 2024. 

Madhesh Province attempted to declare it a disaster emergency — following droughts seen in various regions including Birgunj metropolis and Janakpur sub-metropolis — by sending a letter to the PMO seeking help as the relevant law was lacking for such declaration. 

Third, the spread of dengue in 70 plus districts.

Now, look at the five major catastrophic events — (1) onset of floods, (2) post-monsoon floods, (3) wildfires, (4) drought and (5) dengue. The whole [eco]system was disrupted. This has to be attributed to climate change. 

So risk reduction is so crucial — for which we need financing. Additionally, certain disasters are beyond our comprehension. For instance, dengue, which we need to understand more about.

Such events are increasing. In 2021, there was an unprecedented number of deaths, especially because of landslides. Something close to 400 people died in a year. If we look at this year, how I see it is that over 50 people have already lost their lives due to floods and landslides. (Note that the interview took place on July 7 and 184 people have lost lives to floods and landslides by August 27.)

Comparable countries record at least two to five times more.

So, the investments that we’ve made in terms of setting up the situation and risk communications, the awareness we’ve seen, and the preparedness we’ve done have started to yield initial results. Besides, it would take at least a time frame of 10 years to see tangible results.

And [apparently] by 2030, we could see that investment in risk reduction would pay off.

What you are saying is the scale of the loss could have been larger if NDRRMA’s work weren’t impactful?

You can say the glass is half full or half empty. These disasters could have worsened. We did successfully avert a much larger catastrophe. 

Let’s take an example. For the last 35 years, we tripled our forest cover from something around 15% to 45-48% now, roughly speaking. On the other hand, migration [from rural parts to urban centres and abroad] increased, particularly among males [who traditionally went to forests to collect fuel and fodder]. This act maintained the forest at a distance and decreased the risk of fires spreading to settlements.

But now [with increased migration leaving villages sparse], the forest shrubs have come so close to settlements that a fire there quickly incurs human and property loss and damage and displaces people. Only 1 out of 20 males live in the Gandaki region due to migration. This is so common in the hill areas.

Despite a three-fold increase in the forest cover, we have nearly zero resources for wildfires. So, we came up with courses and training. We also bought a completely new and innovative instrument for the first time — portable fire pumps — from a Canadian company of three categories ranging from Rs 300,000 to Rs 1.4 million.

Such pumps can be run by volunteers by filling water from nearby ponds, lakes and rivers where fire trucks aren’t feasible. We trained community forestry volunteers, wildfire managers, army, police, and APF. We came up with e-learning courses and new technology and bought equipment and gear. 

I have gotten many calls in the early mornings saying if there were no portable fire pumps, we could have lost millions of rupees.

We could have, again, lost 200 people and 20 times the acreage of the forest. We lost 200-400 houses, but the number could have been 4,000. That’s why I am saying, it’s half full. 

The deaths and damages reported and stories covered in the media imply that nothing has gotten better in terms of disaster management. Meanwhile, what you are saying about the impact of NDRRMA’s works is not in the media. 

Exactly.

I particularly want to quote something about smart sirens. Before we came here (NDRRMA), the prevailing technology required manual efforts [like using megaphones and portable speakers on vehicles]. We were not using new IT-enhanced systems. So, we started with 34 smart sirens across the country, especially in the midwest and far west Terai areas.

This year, we added 15 more, which makes it 49 in total. And it works amazingly. You can speak using it from a handheld remote and relay messages [informing the public on dos and don’ts in light of upcoming disasters] from the ward office, the district, the local emergency operations centre, and so on in their preferred language.

[From the NDRRMA office itself] we can press buttons, and inform the local authorities. Rapti Sonari’s chairperson told me that around six people could have died were there no smart siren.

[Besides] we’ve introduced the Bipad Portal, a common national system [or gateway] securing data from a very decentralised source. The local authorities put relevant risk information about floods, landslides, earthquakes, and all by logging into the system with respective usernames and passwords.

We also draw on data sets and information from different ministries and departments like Hydrology and Meteorology; NGOs and INGOs; and academic, and intergovernmental institutions like the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

If you consider it as a stadium, the players are 753 local levels. This is how we could reach out to the public. Otherwise, you need at least 30 PhDs with good knowledge to do all these. The portal is hailed as a flagship success.

You said NDRRMA lacks resources (both human and financial) but we found that your spending from the allocated budget is around 50%. On one hand, you aren’t able to spend the allocated budget, on the other hand, you say there is a lack of budget.

Usually, it’s two things — fewer resources and a low budget, and the irony of not being able to spend the [allocated] budget. Not being able to secure an appropriate budget is a major problem and poor spending is another.

The problem with the latter is that we don’t have the technical staff. Those who we have are mostly seconded from the administration of our ministry. Meanwhile, the existing budget is not adequate for training and capacity-building, and also for planning and disbursement.

For wildfires, we need to understand physics and mechanics, and need mechanical engineers and people who understand chemistry [with knowledge of] — how forest fires spread in a room like this (hinting to his cabin) versus how they spread in a house made of wood and in a high-rise complex like Delta [the fire incident reported in Butwal on June 20].

We also need a separate directorate of at least 30 staff size — led by a joint secretary, who has relevant experience and qualification. The directorate would keep track of fire trucks across the country, station trained human resources, and additionally train more people on a need basis.

In 2009, 13 army men died while dousing a wildfire. Three this year. Security personnel are usually on the frontline when combating disasters. What is NDRRMA doing to equip them?

That’s a tragic case where we lost these 13 army men. Perhaps they lacked adequate training or the right set of gears. 

We need to train these fighters to analyse weather forecasts or to read wind direction flow and other relevant technical aspects of different disasters. For instance, understanding factors such as slope is crucial when the fire is on the slope. Generally speaking, efforts to douse fire on slopes should start from the bottom. If you happen to be on the upslope, the fire will come to you, with wind direction making it worse. This all hasn’t been trained on. 

Other than the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN), we don’t have trained and academically sound fire responders. What we have is peons, office helpers, or drivers functioning as firefighters.

If we see fire fighting in the Western world, firefighters are well-equipped and well-trained people recruited through a rigorous selection process because it has such a huge importance — to save lives. And also to save their own. In addition, those societies highly value lives. We don’t have such [values]. 

We have the rightful agency which is NDRRMA but lacks finances and human resources.

There are records of events in the DRR portal, but for economic losses it’s difficult to rely upon. How robust [and reliable] is the database?

Don’t quote whatever is there in the database. We have not been able to do justice to economic losses and damages. We are realising it now. 

For example, we lost a 22 metres long bridge in Sankhuwasabha. A campsite and a road were hit by five to six metres long debris. This one event alone could account for a loss of more than Rs one billion. However, the database would show that the amount of loss [for over 5,000 incidents of wildfires] so far has been a little over Rs 87 million.

This [discrepancy] is because it is reported based on public testimonials or complaints of disaster that local police received. We are working on completely revamping how economic losses and damage are assessed. 

For earthquakes like Jajarkot, some houses are worth five million rupees and some are worth Rs 300,000. Roughly speaking, the cost of reconstruction for the state is tentatively Rs 500,000. So, 100 houses multiplied by Rs 500,000 is Rs 50 million of loss. 

But we could not go back to each and every house and say, roughly according to the thumb rule, that this house was worth two million rupees, another was worth Rs 15 million, and some houses could be worth Rs 40 million. To account for that, we are yet to develop a system backed up by adequate wherewithal, human resources, and orientation. 

We are about to complete a story on wildfire. We are trying to see how big the problem is. It seems we are taking wildfire lightly in the lack of economic loss assessment.

I think we don’t even have a methodology to account for it. For example, we count the events of wildfires based on the dots as seen from the Satellite imagery system. But one fire could have caused millions of losses like high-value timber stock. The ecosystem could have been lost to the extent that it could not rejuvenate. There’s no estimate of wildlife lost. 

Apart from the human losses, we have lost houses, schools, and temples. We haven’t been able to put price tags on them. But, we could tell how many acres of forest got burnt at each local level, down to every ward. Let’s say, at this ward, 13 acres and 60 acres overall at this local level.

It also depends on forest species. A simple example, is an acre of a forest of Uttis burn versus an acre of Loth Salla (Himalayan yew) — the economic loss would be in billions due to its medicinal value. The price tag of the ecosystems in the mountains could be in the millions. In other places, it could be less. We don’t know how to account for its economic damage and losses. After the discourse of climate change-induced loss and damage has come globally, it’s gradually extending to Nepal as well. 

Apart from that, we topped the charts for roughly around 2-3 weeks a year globally in terms of worst air pollution, between late April and early May, owing mainly to wildfires, in addition to pollution from factories, brick kilns, bad traffic, road conditions and so on. It’s also because of the movement of bad air quality, consisting of crop residue and stubble burning, coming from the neighbouring countries following the wind pattern from the south to the north direction. 

What’s striking is, we prematurely lose around 36,000 people every year because of bad air quality. If you look at that, that’s around 1-1.5% of our GDP. That’s soaring up annually. 

One, we face a financing gap. Another, losses and damages accumulate with every disaster. There’s a responsibility on the shoulders of the development sector and rich countries to manage finances for us, but what’s your experience in securing such funds? 

Our own set of experiences working with all the development partners has been cumbersome. Just to process a moderately-sized project to lower the risk of glacial lake outbursts, has taken us five to six years. We’re still uncertain whether we’re going to get that money amounting to $30-35 million. That’s too bureaucratic.

The global architectures have set up mechanisms that impede access to global financing. In the end, only a small amount of funds get released with so many conditions and processes to meet for. This has to change.

What should it be like?

Direct access of finances for the Government of Nepal from the global pool.

The current scenario is that development partners look for intermediaries. You need to fulfill due diligence, accrediting certain institutions. This process has become heavy.

There needs to be a fast-track mechanism for fund mobilisation for disaster-vulnerable countries like ours. The money needs to be conditioned for spending according to the national priorities through agencies like NDRRMA — to quickly build houses damaged by floods and landslides, move from high-risk zones to safer zones, etc.

For wildfires, we need at least $50 million to procure helicopters and Bambi buckets; to build ponds and reservoirs like Kulekhani; and [make abundant] fire lines. We need additional resources and financing for damaged houses. Additionally, glacial lakes are increasing, and reducing them is so complex and expensive. We need easy and direct access to funds.

We are always at risk of disasters round the year. It’s like we walk a step ahead and then a disaster hits pushing us back two steps. What do you think should radically be done?

We examined three kinds of buildings at 145 municipal levels across the country: schools, health facilities, and public buildings. What we found out is that nearly one-fourth of the buildings should be classified as a no-go zone. They need to be demolished and then reconstructed anew because they might trap children, doctors, patients, and staff like ourselves.

About 2-3% of these buildings shouldn’t have been built where they are, many of which were built where they are today because someone donated land at that time. They are at high risk of being swept one day, located either at the top or bottom of a landslide-prone area.

Similarly, buildings have been constructed in flood-prone places. Almost one-fourth out of 30,000 buildings should be demolished. Another one-third needs to be retrofitted. We know this. I’ll not say ‘if’. When there’s an event, we will lose not only these buildings but people inside them.

We need finances as much as Rs 10 billion this year only, but how much do we get? A few crores. There’s this enormous mismatch. If we take into account the lessons of 2015 earthquake reconstruction and recovery, we need to spend a sizable amount every year. 

Look at Karnali. About 81.4% of the buildings are made out of rounded-up stones and mud mortars, without any vertical or horizontal bonds, bindings, and lintels — making such buildings death traps. Only by demolishing all those death trap-like houses and buildings and reconstructing new ones, perhaps steel-designed, could we save lives.

We were lucky in 2023 that there was moderate shaking in Jajarkot. Else 81% of those houses could have perished. But a pent-up tectonic pressure still lies under the region. The western Nepal saw a big earthquake in the year 1505, which was over 8 in magnitude. It’s been said we lost one-third of the population at that time. 

Institutions including provincial governments need to be provided with technical skills, masons, and capacity to strengthen stone-made and wood-made houses.